THE SINO-RUSSIAN TANDEM AND THE WEST

 For at least two centuries, the geopolitical triangle West – Russia – China has been undergoing successive transformations. Initially, the West and Russia engaged in a competitive collaboration to plunder the expiring "Celestial Empire." Subsequently, the West attempted to use the People's Republic of China as a counterweight to the Soviet threat. And, during the brief period of American unipolarity that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington, largely supported by its allies and partners, dealt with both Beijing and Moscow without any apparent strategic planning—if not with a significant dose of carefree arrogance. However, the exponential rise of Chinese power, the dynamic return of Russia to the global geopolitical arena, and the emerging rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing now compel the West to decide between continuing and likely escalating the simultaneous confrontation with these two powers or pursuing flexible diplomacy to disrupt their developing common front.

Hard Power Dynamics

Even a cursory look at the balance of "hard power" between the four militarily strongest Western countries — USA, UK, Germany, and France—, and, on the other hand, China and Russia makes clear the vital nature of this dilemma. Although the West, in terms of military spending, vastly outstrips the potential Sino-Russian axis (the US defense budget alone is more than double the sum of the corresponding Chinese and Russian), the Russian nuclear arsenal is at the top of global rankings, marginally exceeding the American one. And, under Xi’s presidency, Beijing is rapidly expanding its already significant nuclear forces.

With respect to the nuclear scene, it should be stressed that both Russians and Chinese—just as, on the Western side, the Americans, the British, and the French — possess a "second-strike capability" that raises the specter of "mutually assured destruction." This is to say that a conventional military confrontation with these two powers carries a risk of escalation into a nuclear holocaust. Strategic realism, therefore, dictates that the West avoids, to the extent possible, a military escalation with each of the two separately and, a fortiory, with both simultaneously. And it is likely that the leaders of Russia and China, notwithstanding their opportunistic public statements, harbor similar fears about the Western nuclear posture.

Chinese Objectives

Regarding the state of Western relations with Beijing: The most recent American "National Security Strategy" considers the PRC as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it”. The European Council, in June 2023, while calling China a "partner," named it also "a competitor and a systemic rival." And beyond the official pronouncements, China’s emergence in global affairs is widely recognized as a historic development reminiscent in many ways of the rise of the United States since the early twentieth century.

Addressing the risks to American interests from the expanding Chinese world role, Washington, under President Obama, undertook a major revision of its China policy aimed at containing Beijing—primarily in the Asia-Pacific area but not solely. However, this "Pivot to Asia" was largely impeded, partly by Western adventurism in the broader Middle East but mainly by the downturn in the West’s relations with Russia.

 West-Russia Relations

In the strategic climate shaped by the war in Ukraine, NATO's June 2022 "Strategic Concept" refers to the Russian Federation as "the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area". The EU’s "Strategic Compass for Security and Defense" of March 2022 characterizes Russian policies as "a long-term and direct threat for European security." And the Atlantic Alliance’s "Washington Summit Declaration" of July 2024 predicts that "the all-domain threat Russia poses to NATO will persist into the long term".

For the rising tensions in its relations with Moscow, the West is not altogether without blame. But this certainly does not in the least justify the unreservedly condemnable Russian invasion of Ukraine, against which Americans and Europeans rightly provided Kyiv with decisive assistance.

However, the course of the war now calls for tough decisions on the part of the West. Significant voices on both sides of the Atlantic continue to oppose a negotiated end to the conflict and, indeed, are pushing for the intensification of hostilities with a view to defeating Russia and bringing about regime change in Moscow. But this goal, seemingly achievable after the initial Russian military setbacks, is now clearly beyond reach. Those who persist in pursuing it ignore, in addition to the nuclear threat, the toxic geopolitical effects of the Sino-Russian rapprochement.

A Disquieting Alignment

Under Western pressure, Russia is increasingly becoming what a reputable American newspaper refers to as a "junior partner" of China (The U.S. should beware of the Beijing-Moscow axis, The Washington Post, March 25, 2023). Inter alia, Moscow serves as a useful tool in Beijing’s efforts to pull the so-called Global South—essentially most of humanity, including key regional powers in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—away from Western influence. A typical case is that of the BRICS: an intergovernmental organization critical of the Western order and encompassing 45 percent of the world's population, in which according to two analysts, Russia plays the role of the "angry, vocal spearhead," but China is "the real driving force." (Vide Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, The Battle for the BRICS, Foreign Affairs, September 224, 2024.) While yet another unwelcome, from a Western perspective, outgrowth of the Sino-Russian entente is the formation, under essentially Chinese auspices, of an anti-Western geopolitical alignment that comprises, besides China and Russia, North Korea and Iran.

Resolving the Ukrainian crisis certainly does not mean surrendering to the Kremlin's whims. The Western objective should be to end the war through a realistic, viable compromise. Some analysts believe this could have already been achieved if, at a more propitious stage of the hostilities, Washington had exercised its decisive influence over Kyiv – whose political agenda does not always align with the broader Western interests. Nonetheless, despite the positive developments for the Russian side on the battlefield and the limited effectiveness of Western sanctions, President Putin may still be open to meaningful negotiations. After all, over the twenty-four years he has ruled, either as prime minister or president, and notwithstanding his tragically flawed calculations and maneuvers, particularly as to Ukraine, he has mostly proven to be a "rational geopolitical player”; aware no doubt of the risks faced by a Russia entangled simultaneously in acute confrontation with the Western World and in a state of dependency on China. In any case, it is in the West’s interest to test his intentions, given that a successful negotiation would not only put an end to the war and reduce the risk of nuclear escalation but very likely contribute as well to Moscow's disengagement from Beijing's embrace.

Underlying Sino-Russian Tensions

Despite the circumstantial rapprochement of the two Eurasian giants, major conflicts of interest continue to lurk beneath the surface. For example, although a long-standing Sino-Russian border dispute was settled by treaty two decades ago, the Russians have not ceased to worry about potential Chinese territorial aspirations at their expense. Moscow is also concerned about the challenge posed to its influence in Central Asia by China's "Belt and Road Initiative" and in the Arctic by the intense Chinese activity there. And the growing presence of the two associates in East Asia and the Pacific bears a distinctly competitive stamp. While in the military field, Chinese armaments and particularly the ambitious Chinese nuclear program are naturally a source of concern for the Russians.

As a result, even if only a partial normalization of Russia’s relations with the West is achieved, the underlying Sino-Russian tensions will probably come to the fore. But only if the Western powers re-evaluate their policy toward Moscow. Primarily by forgetting the chimera of transforming Russia into a mirror copy of the West. The espousal by the Russian leadership and society of the country’s authoritarian traditions is a development probably inevitable in the short term and potentially a long-term one, as it is widely perceived by the Russian public as a guarantor of the cohesion and security of the Russian Federation; both of which were severely tested under the faux democratization that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Geopolitical realism dictates that the West seek a modus vivendi with Putin's authoritarian regime rather than with the Russia of our dreams.

Ideally, in managing relations between the West and the Sino-Russian tandem, Europeans would focus on Russia while Americans on China. Sadly, the problematic state of the European Defense and Security Policy makes such a division of labor practically impossible. Irrespective of the preferences of those in power in Western capitals, Washington is driven by the force of circumstance to play the leading role on both these fronts. It remains, of course, to be seen if it will rise to the occasion.

As a final note: It is self-evident, yet worth emphasizing, that the adoption by the West of geopolitical realism as a guideline in managing its relations with the two major powers of Eurasia does not comport the downgrading of Western socio-political values. On the contrary, the peaceful projection of these values acts as a multiplier to the "soft power" of the Western world. On the strict condition that no attempt is made to impose them – especially by military force.