Assessing the Russian crisis

 

The failed coup of Wagner’s boss Prigozhin against the Russian regime has given rise in the West to assessments of its impact that are, as a rule, more of a reflection of their authors’ hopes and fears than a clear-eyed view of events.

From a Western standpoint, the crucial question is whether we are witnessing the opening phase of violent regime change, and, if so, what would that entail for the War in Ukraine and the West.

The prevalent view in the West is that President Putin has been delt a blow from which he will be unable to fully recover; that, as a result, sooner rather than later, his reign will come to an end – probably a violent one; and that such a turn of events would prove beneficial to Western interests. Skepticism, however, is in order on all these counts.

To begin with, the deft and at the same time decisive way in which the Russian president handled the rebellion has most probably strengthened, not weakened, his domestic standing. As in the case of Erdogan, an isolated, unsuccessful attempt at toppling the holder of power tends to work in his favor. The depiction therefore of the Russian strongman as a “dead man walking” is rather fanciful, and at any rate quite divorced from reality.

On the other hand, the overthrow of the Russian leadership in the present circumstances, instead of promoting the legitimate Western interests, would most probably place them in jeopardy. Putin, despite his occasional bluster and his tragic strategic blunder in invading Ukraine, has proven to be a rational player. Moreover, he has succeeded in keeping the fractious nuclear superpower he heads united. While there is reason to fear that his putative successors would prove more extremist vis-a- vis the West and Ukraine, if only to survive politically, and less capable of keeping the Russian nuclear arsenal under control.